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Introduction 
Until the late 1980s, competition between universities was limited, and the 
allocation of funding by the University Grants Committee created a system 
that was more akin to central planning than to a competitive market. 
Following the advice of the Treasury, the Labour government of the late 
1980s and the National government of the early 1990s increasingly 
encouraged universities to compete for students. From 2000 onwards, the 
Labour-led government began to question the value of competition between 
public institutions such as universities, and to seek ways to minimise 
competitive duplication of courses and research programmes (Associate 
Minister of Education, 2000; Watkin, 2000). 
Despite the position of the Labour-led governments since 2000, 
competition between universities over 2000–06 has been perhaps more 
vigorous than it has ever been. This is because competition to attract 
students continues, and a range of schemes such as Partnerships for 
Excellence, Centres of Research Excellence, and the Performance-Based 
Research Fund (PBRF) have encouraged universities to enter into vigorous 
competition for the limited funds available.2
The vigour of the competition is also a result of changes in the 
international environment. For all sectors, including higher education, both 
the level of competition and the opportunities for benefit have been 
increased by the declining cost of travel, the improvement in standard of 
living of formerly low-income countries, the growing importance of the 
service sector and the dramatic fall in the costs of communication, including 
those relating to modes of learning.3 The government has actively promoted 
‘export education’ as a strategy for the tertiary sector, which has the effect 
of placing New Zealand tertiary institutions in direct competition with 
universities in Australia, Canada, the United States of America (US), the 
United Kingdom (UK), Europe, and (increasingly) Singapore, Hong Kong 
and Thailand. Even without export education, the universities now need to 
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compete with the best universities in Australia to retain the best domestic 
students in New Zealand, let alone attract students from other countries. 
In this chapter, we set the competition promoted by the PBRF in 
context by considering the costs and benefits of competition in the tertiary 
sector. We acknowledge the government has been correct in expressing the 
concern that competition for Student Component funding associated with 
the introduction of low-quality programmes at low-quality institutions is 
inefficient. However, we suggest this inefficiency was a result of the 
perverse incentives provided by the Student Component funding regime and 
institutional governance arrangements, not a result of competition. Overall, 
our view is that the weakness of the governance structure of the universities 
and the difficulties of assessing quality in tertiary education make 
competition such as that engendered by the PBRF critical for the 
development of a world-class tertiary education system in New Zealand. 
Nature of tertiary education, funding, costs 
and incentives 
In this section, we consider the issues that relate to understanding the costs 
and incentives facing tertiary institutions. The topic is important if the links 
between competition and funding are to be understood. 
Incentives are substantially affected by the presence of competition, by 
which we mean a process of rivalry between institutions in markets.  
It includes rivalry in price, and altered or improved products or techniques 
of production, brand awareness and reputation, and the provision of 
information to consumers. Competition produces benefits for consumers, 
and for society as a whole because it induces organisations to be internally 
efficient, make the optimal use of resources, and make investment decisions 
that will provide the organisation with competitive advantages in the future. 
Difficulties of measuring quality in service industries 
Tertiary education is a service.4 As such, it has outputs that are very 
difficult to quantify. The number of students enrolled represents only the 
crudest possible measure of outputs, because the quality of the teaching and 
learning at tertiary education institutions (TEIs) is not directly observable 
by third parties. While experience (consumption) of TEI services offers 
intimate knowledge of the outputs, it is really only over time that quality 
can be evaluated.5 Tertiary education is an activity where reputation can be 
established only over a long time as multiple cohorts of graduates have the 
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opportunity to reflect on their experience. Reputation matters because it is 
the basis on which future generations assess quality before experiencing it. 
The difficulty in measuring educational quality directly is accentuated 
by the asymmetry of information between TEI staff and managers on the 
one side and students and funders on the other. The existence of information 
asymmetry is a central feature of the modern literature on regulation. 
Importantly, this literature indicates that firms have more information than 
the regulators and that this should affect the design of regulatory schemes 
that, in the case of tertiary education, include public subsidies. Price 
regulation is normally applied to utilities that produce outputs with tangible 
indicators of measurement (e.g. mega-watt hours, number of interruptions in 
supply). It is challenging enough to quantify the goods and services of 
utilities, but the indicators of educational service are far more difficult to 
assess and this leaves much scope for staff and management to engage in 
practices that promote their own interests rather than those of students and 
funders (neither of whose interests are exactly aligned either). 
We should therefore expect the parameters of any funding scheme to be 
exploited in the interest of TEI staff and management.6 The exploitation can 
arise in the design of courses, the quality of courses, and the choice and 
emolument of staff. We should also expect that this tendency would be most 
apparent where the level of funding was designed to cover the bulk of 
institutional costs, because this removes the risk that strategies designed to 
provide greater perquisites to staff and management will result in 
embarrassing and public examination of the finances and practices of the 
institution.7 For example, an obvious strategy to adopt in a world of base 
viability funding would be to set unreasonably low enrolment limits on 
courses, claiming that this was required to protect quality, when, in fact, it 
might have been designed to reduce staff workloads. 
Public funding and competition 
Competition requires that customers choose from among alternative 
suppliers. In the university context, services are funded by a mix of 
government Student Component funding per student, student fee payments 
and other sources of income. Categories of Student Component funding are 
(very crudely) based on historical costs of supplying teaching and research 
services in different subject areas. Competition is fostered by students being 
able to bring their tuition fees and Student Component funding with them to 
the institution they choose. Public research-specific funding is still 
sufficiently limited as to provide only muted incentives for universities 
because they still draw on Student Component funding and student fees to 
undertake many of their research activities. 
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Aggregate student funding is limited by the amount of the direct 
government subsidy and what is essentially a fee cap that requires 
government approval. This limits competition since it limits the advantages 
to the university of ‘doing something different’, reduces rewards from good 
performance and weakens the incentives for universities to focus on their 
actual and potential customers. 
Governance 
Asymmetric information issues are more acute in services, and rendered 
more important by there being no effective ownership interest in New 
Zealand TEIs that can focus governance on the cash or social surplus 
delivered by the institution. The councils of TEIs are large and diffuse in 
membership, including having substantial staff and student representation. 
The best that can be said of them is that some balance may be obtained as a 
result of competing private interest agendas being pursued at the council 
table. Neither the council nor the management and staff have a direct 
interest in the generation of a budget surplus.  
The situation is compounded by the absence of a hard bankruptcy 
constraint because of government ownership. Staff, management and 
council members believe, and recent experience suggests, the government 
will bail out institutions in which bad management creates a major financial 
or quality problem. In these circumstances, a large financial or social 
surplus is simply not in the interest of the staff and management of these 
institutions.8 Even surpluses that are otherwise required to preserve 
institutional viability (e.g. provision for depreciation are vulnerable to the 
short-term exigencies preferred by staff, management and students (who 
generally weight expenditure on the current cohort of students more heavily 
than may be optimal for the institution’s long-term reputation). 
Endogenous costs 
The difficulty in assessing the quality of services and the limitations of 
university governance structures affects the interpretation that can be placed 
on the cost of providing these services. In particular, costs in publicly 
funded TEIs are endogenous, in that they expand to consume the revenue 
provided. This is particularly so because TEIs provide services and are 
human-capital–intensive institutions: commonly, nearly 60% of total cost is 
accounted for by direct personnel costs in universities, being somewhat 
lower in some other TEIs. Further, the larger is the fraction of institutional 
revenue provided directly by the government to institutions, the more acute 
the problem of endogenous costs becomes. 
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Endogenous costs mean institutional data provide a poor basis for 
inferring relative costs. Costs rise to meet the funding. Similarly, the 
structure of costs will be shaped by the structure of the funding: large grants 
for university capital expenditure will result in universities that have high 
quality buildings whether they need them or not. Of course, the smaller the 
share of government payments in total TEI revenue, and the greater the 
competition faced by TEIs, the less scope there is for staff and management 
to raise personnel costs and the less impact the structure of government 
funding has on the actual cost structure. 
When government provides the bulk of revenue by direct funding, the 
amount and structure of the funding will be most important for the 
institutions. In the context of the political economy, it can be viewed as a 
form of cost-plus pricing.9 More specifically, at the level of the TEI, for 
example, an unbounded uniform payment per equivalent full-time student 
does pose problems since, even if it is set at a level that enables funding a 
certain quality of education, it will provide an incentive for courses 
providing lower quality but higher staff-management perquisites, providing 
they attract students. With open-ended funding, there remains an incentive 
to enrol (compete for) students; when funding is capped, competition is 
curtailed. In this latter case particularly, the monitoring that would be 
required to enforce specified quality standards would be prohibitively 
costly. The greater the ability of the customers to take their custom 
elsewhere, the lower is the need for external monitoring and the stronger are 
the incentives to compete on quality. 
Performance measurement 
The problems with the measurability of the quality of the services provided 
by TEIs and the efficiency of TEIs may be ameliorated when there are 
meaningful signals about performance.10 In practice, the scope for the 
pursuit of private interest by TEIs’ staff, management and current students 
will be constrained by three factors: measures of research quality, the 
willingness of students to pay for the courses they take and competition 
between programmes of study (in which both research and student 
willingness to pay may be significant factors). 
The quality of a research institution is indicated by the quality of its 
research outputs and this is derived from the quality and quantity of its staff. 
Research quality is imperfectly measured. It is signalled by the record of 
contributions to the research literature, but this is difficult to measure in any 
precise way. For research staff, some external market basis for the 
assessment of the quality of the research contribution is provided by the fact 
these staff participate in an international labour market. The credibility of 
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this signal is enhanced by the fact it rests on judgements about quality made 
by all institutions in the market.11 There is no such obvious (imperfect) 
benchmark for the non-research institutions: these may therefore have more 
scope for the pursuit of the self-interest of management, staff and current 
students (particularly where volume input measures are used as an indicator 
of quality). 
Competition, particularly competition for fee-paying students and 
research dollars, is extremely important in inducing tertiary institutions to 
focus in a cost-effective way on quality. Further, the higher the proportion 
of the total cost of their education that is paid by students, and the larger the 
proportion of funding that is generated by competition in research 
performance, the more important competition will be in disciplining the 
self-interested behaviour of current management, staff and students. It is 
difficult for a funding agency to duplicate the discipline of fee-paying 
students on institutions because its position as a third party accentuates the 
asymmetric information problem. 
Benefits of competition between universities 
Competition 
In all industries, there is a balance between competition and cooperation 
that enhances economic and social performance. Competition is important 
because it means customers’ demands must be addressed. Change results 
from attempts to meet their demands better. In a competitive environment, 
the ‘competitors’ should not be indifferent about their success or failure: 
they should benefit from the former and be accountable for the latter. 
Cooperation is desirable when it arises from the attempts of competing 
firms to use comparative advantage or scale across multiple institutions to 
better meet consumers’ needs. Cooperation is consistent with competition 
unless it is mandated by a process of central planning. The costs and 
benefits of central planning are well known (e.g. Stiglitz, 1994). The costs, 
in particular, reflect the difficulties in getting (unaccountable) suppliers 
interested in consumers’ demands, the adoption of one view of the world 
when competing views and actions better accommodate the uncertainty 
associated with future states of the world and better serve the heterogeneous 
needs of consumers, and the limitations on the development of new 
technology that stem from rivalry between suppliers. 
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Cooperation induced by central planning 
The alternative to competition is some form of central planning. Central 
planning presumes the quantity and quality of goods and services can be 
specified, and, once specified, delivered. However, with education services 
it is extraordinarily difficult for a third party to assess the quality and 
suitability for consumers of what has been delivered. Judgement of the 
services delivered by TEIs is best provided by the customers, particularly 
when they have alternative suppliers and can vote with their feet. 
For tertiary education services, measurement by audit is unsatisfactory 
because of its necessary reliance on those elements of the service that are 
directly quantifiable, its reliance on information provided by the 
institutions, and because it must focus on process. No unique type or quality 
of educational experience can be inferred from process, since education is 
an experience good. Furthermore, in a central planning environment, heavy 
reliance on audit will tend to dictate, or enable the central planner to dictate, 
‘acceptable’ approaches and courses of study. The dangers of this are 
illustrated by the fact that even in the current funding environment for 
tertiary education in New Zealand, the combination of public funding rule 
and private fee caps serves to limit the supply of educational opportunities 
that some consumers may have been willing to pay for. 
Given that the empirical evidence does not provide strong support for 
the existence of meaningful economies of scale in tertiary education 
services, it is doubtful that central planning can be justified by a 
requirement to generate critical mass through coordination at the national 
level.12 Hence, there would not seem to be a cost reason for agglomeration 
into (say) a model where there is one advanced-education/research 
university and a set of teaching institutions.13 Indeed, strong evidence 
supports the view that to succeed internationally, a ‘national champion’ firm 
requires that the national champion status is reached in a rivalrous market. 
The most prominent piece of empirical work in this area was conducted by 
Porter (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations. The study surveyed 
10 developed economies with the evidence pointing to a strong positive link 
between the level of domestic competition and a nation’s international 
competitiveness, contrary to the national champion’s view.14 Porter (p. 117) 
concludes, “[w]e found … few ‘national champions’, or firms with virtually 
unrivalled domestic positions, that were internationally competitive. 
Instead, more were uncompetitive though often heavily subsidised and 
protected”. Thus, participating in the competitive global education market is 
desirable for New Zealand universities because it will enhance their 
performance in New Zealand, even with the current ownership and 
governance structures. 
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Another argument for central planning and the agglomeration of 
tertiary education services is that on the international scene, the New 
Zealand brand determines the image of education institutions, and poor 
performance by any subset of domestic institutions will upset this image. 
We question the validity of this proposition, but even if it held an element 
of truth, the quality of the education experience is paramount to long-term 
reputation and this is promoted by domestic competition and competition 
between New Zealand institutions that extends beyond New Zealand’s 
shores. 
Costs of ruling out competition between 
universities 
Local monopoly power 
Universities have local monopoly power, both by virtue of their locations 
and by virtue of the monopoly rights granted by government to operate 
certain franchises. Most firms with large consumer catchment areas have 
some localised monopoly power relating to the costs of consumers shopping 
in a different locality. In the university sector, this monopoly power is 
eroded by competition in a variety of forms, including distance education, 
the threat of entry from competing providers (new university campuses and 
other tertiary providers that develop degree programmes), and students’ 
ability to take programmes at other institutions if firms exploit that 
monopoly power. This ability is enhanced by the lower communication and 
transport costs of modern economies. 
Exemption from the Commerce Act 1986 
If competition between the universities were ruled out by the government, 
this could be held to give universities an exemption from the Commerce Act 
1986. The government has not actually ruled out competition or gone as far 
as to provide a section 20 statement to the Commerce Commission for an 
exemption from the Commerce Act’s anti-trust provisions. But its public 
pronouncements on the costs of competition and the need for cooperation 
and coordination signal much the same thing in practice. 
The problem with reducing competition in this way, is that a university 
is just like any other firm in suffering reductions in efficiency and imposing 
losses of welfare on society as a whole if it is not subject to the disciplines 
of competition. 
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The implications of funding regulations that essentially produce 
exemptions from the Commerce Act are illustrated by some universities 
already having been granted national monopoly franchises. The most 
obvious examples are the monopoly franchises in the offer of medicine and 
dentistry. This has two implications. First, in the absence of entry as a 
competitive threat, the University of Auckland and the University of Otago 
have much reduced incentives to compete with each other; it is better for 
them to reach agreements to divide the market (such as through agreed 
limitations on enrolment) and collect the rents associated with this franchise 
than to compete the rents away. Second, they may seek to exploit that local 
monopoly power by leveraging it into related programmes. For example, a 
refusal to accept students from medical intermediate programmes run by 
other universities might be held to constitute a welfare-reducing attempt to 
leverage local monopoly power. 
Not-for-profit firms benefit from exploiting market 
power 
Universities are not-for-profit institutions, which means they are not subject 
to taxation and have binding constraints on the distribution of profits that 
remove ‘maximising returns to shareholders’ as the modus operandi of the 
organisation. But, as Philipson and Posner (2001) have shown, the 
efficiency costs arising from an absence of competition between not-for-
profit firms are just as large as the efficiency costs of reduced competition 
between for-profit firms.15
Not-for-profit institutions may seek rents because their governance 
structure has been captured by groups wishing to use it to subsidise certain 
types of consumer. Subsidies provide an alternative means of distributing 
excess profits. 
Not-for-profit institutions may also seek returns above the competitive 
level because these profits are the source of perquisites and provide 
insulation that protects senior managers and council members from the 
damage to their reputation that would follow from large losses and 
government bailouts. 
Uncertainty about the most productive paths for 
developing knowledge 
Competitive decision making is particularly important in sectors where 
technology and knowledge are changing very rapidly. This is because it is 
not possible ex ante to be sure which path in the development of knowledge 
will yield the greatest benefits to society. Having only one research centre 
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in each field would place New Zealand at risk of intellectual stranding 
(investment in research that is not at the cutting edge of the field). 
Therefore, while some people might argue that New Zealand, being small, 
cannot afford to have competition between universities, it might 
alternatively be argued that it is precisely because New Zealand is small 
that there may be high costs associated with restrictions on competition 
between universities: without researchers at different universities being able  
to compete by pursuing different paths in the development of knowledge, 
we have a high risk of intellectual stranding. 
Wasteful competition 
Competition may produce similar research or teaching programmes at 
different institutions, but in a competitive tertiary environment, we would 
not expect this to represent duplication or constitute a waste of resources. 
This is because heterogeneous approaches to research or teaching may 
produce benefits associated with a greater range of new knowledge being 
developed or imparted, as well as better performance in quality and 
quantity, than if only one approach were permitted. Only when 
accountability is lacking and incentives for welfare-enhancing activities are 
weak will wasteful expenditures emerge. 
Competition and incentives with the PBRF 
The PBRF is, in essence, a fixed pool of funding divided among tertiary 
institutions based on certain measures of their research performance. By 
providing a significant source of income based on certain measures of 
performance, the PBRF provides a defined set of incentives for TEIs, which 
include a greater focus on measured research activities, an increase in 
externally funded research and larger numbers of postgraduate students, and 
achieving rankings (and thus funding) superior to those of the other eligible 
institutions.16
In this section, we consider the competitive mechanisms the PBRF 
generates and the incentives it provides. 
Competition 
While the PBRF is both a funding scheme and a means of placing greater 
accountability on universities, it is our view that the PBRF’s primary impact 
will be in generating an increase in the quality and quantity of research and 
research-related teaching in New Zealand through enhanced competition 
between institutions. 
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The impact of the PBRF at the institutional level will depend in part on 
the extent of competition across all aspects of university operations. The 
more competitive is the environment within which institutions function, the 
better attuned these institutions will be to the incentives provided by the 
funding scheme and the demands of students, and the greater impact any 
sharpening of incentives (such as through the PBRF) will have on the 
performance of institutions as a whole. 
The incentives for universities to compete by focusing on those 
activities that contribute to the research performance measured by PBRF are 
increased by the: 
• fixed pool, which means each university’s funding is determined 
relative to other universities’ performance, not against any absolute 
measures of performance; 
• likelihood the government will provide any increases in tertiary funding 
through the PBRF, not through changes to Student Component funding; 
and 
• ordinal ranking system that allows one institution to be identified as 
having the best research performance overall and in each discipline or 
nominated academic unit. 
We can view the PBRF as a tournament where prizes attend the 
consequent rankings. The prizes take the form of reputation and direct 
funding. Tournaments are well known in the labour economics literature as 
useful competitive devices where an ordinal performance ranking is 
determinable, but quantification of the ranking margins is impossible 
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981). This is surely the case in the service sector more 
generally and in the tertiary education sector specifically. 
The higher the prize and the more independent the institutions, the 
more intense will be the competition in a tournament and the more accurate 
will be the rankings that it provides because each institution has strong 
incentives to provide all information relevant to the assessment that drives 
the tournament. Tournaments are particularly useful when the institutions 
operate in a common environment and thus where the tournament rankings 
reflect the factors that go to generating good performance and not 
extraneous factors that vary across institutions. In the case of tertiary 
education this requirement is satisfied, thereby shoring up the rationale for 
using tournaments. Universities, in particular, find themselves in the same 
environment in the case of the PBRF. 
Competition for research funding and competition for students are 
strongly complementary. Competition for graduate students and research 
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funding clearly interact: but the preparation of graduate students is also 
recognised in the design of, and should be enabled by resources put into, 
undergraduate degrees. Such competition does not rule out inter-university 
joint venture arrangements for projects that exploit universities’ relative 
strengths; but where central government directives rule out competition for 
students, then the competitive benefits of the PBRF are likely to be muted. 
The magnitude and nature of the prize will also affect the success of the 
PBRF. The effect of a significant level of prize on the focus on research is 
obvious. For the reputation ‘prize’ to be important nationally and, 
particularly, internationally, it is critical the exercise be credible by 
international standards. Assessing research output is an activity that, 
whether carried out for the PBRF or other purposes, is not quantifiable and 
rests very heavily on judgement. The efficacy of the scheme then depends 
on the pursuit of objectivity in assessment and, conceptually at least, 
requires independent assessors. The scheme’s design should reflect these 
factors. We consider the PBRF could be improved in this respect by 
investing greater resources in employing subject experts with no 
connections to New Zealand researchers to assess the quality of outputs 
against international standards. But consideration of improvement requires 
an understanding of the objective. 
The requirement that all academic staff be assessed has, by comparison 
with the system in the UK, resulted in less emphasis on buying star 
researchers and more emphasis on dealing with the non-performance in 
research of staff who are being paid to undertake research. Indeed the 
requirement to assess all academic staff focuses on a widespread problem in 
the New Zealand university sector – staff who are on contracts and teaching 
loads that enable research activity, but who can provide no tangible 
evidence of research productivity. We consider this emphasis particularly 
important in New Zealand, where the absence of a system of ‘tenure’ (such 
as that used in universities in Canada and the US) reduces the incentives for 
junior staff to focus on research and allows the possibility that staff may 
have long-term careers in the New Zealand universities without ever having 
undertaken any internationally credible research. 
However, we consider the requirement to assess all staff is 
inappropriate in another sense: high-performing institutions may utilise 
specialisation allowing some staff to focus on research and graduate student 
supervision and others to focus on undergraduate teaching. But this in turn 
suggests the long-term competitive response to the PBRF will come through 
the stronger performance management of staff who are not research active. 
One component of this management may be the development of 
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differentiated contracts that allow heavier teaching loads for staff who 
demonstrate limited research potential or productivity. 
A more balanced approach would focus on measuring the performance 
of universities as institutions, taking into account both teaching and 
research. This would reflect the fact high performance in schools and 
departments requires staff with various skills and abilities. Although 
subsequent assessment schemes that focus on teaching and learning might 
provide greater balance, we doubt this since centrally administered 
tournaments require ordinal judgements that are much more difficult to 
apply in teaching than research. In our view, student choices about the 
institution at which they wish to study and the programmes they wish to 
study are, at least in the medium term, likely to be more effective in 
assessing teaching quality than any externally administered assessment 
scheme. 
The PBRF contains two elements of assessment that have the potential 
to drive competition in directions that may be inappropriate. The 
‘contribution to research environment’ component is but an intermediate 
step in producing a school or department research output and should not be 
counted in assessing university performance. The ‘peer esteem’ component 
is particularly hard to justify because it opens the door wide for researchers 
to seek high rankings through the small social networks of researchers in 
New Zealand rather than relying simply on the ability to publish in quality 
international outlets as the sole proxy for peer esteem. Peer judgements are 
provided through the refereeing of publications but they are limited to the 
publication itself. Peer esteem thus may not provide any credible 
information additional to that provided by the publication record. 
In providing funding incentives for universities to generate external 
support for research, the PBRF both increases competition between 
universities for the research contracts available through the Foundation for 
Research, Science and Technology, the Marsden Fund and the Health 
Research Council, and increases the incentives for universities to compete 
with Crown research institutes and private research organisations to obtain 
these funds. To the extent that cooperation between institutions increases 
the chances of making a successful bid, cooperation may be encouraged, but 
there are also strong incentives to compete to be the lead contractor and thus 
claim the PBRF income from ‘booking’ the base revenue for the contract.  
Incentives and funding regimes 
The incentives provided by the funding of all relevant activities combine to 
shape the activities of the institution as a whole. Higher, competitive 
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research funding, induces higher research performance in the sector, 
rendering the sector more internationally competitive and reducing any 
proclivity to offer courses that do not attract students, no matter what the 
institutional priorities of the staff. 
Higher research funding also has the potential to resolve one of the 
most anomalous features of the current Student Component funding system, 
and the one that has provided the most perverse incentives in recent years. 
In effect, there are two types of TEI in New Zealand: those whose staff do 
research and those whose staff do not.17 Research-based TEIs have much 
higher costs of teaching than non-research TEIs, because they must provide 
their staff with time to do research as well as teach. However, the base 
levels of Student Component funding for different degrees make no 
allowance for these differences in the costs of teaching at research 
institutions.18
When the fee payable by the government is the same per degree across 
institutional types and high enough to allow some research, the non-
research institutions have a free option in that they can engage in research 
and, if successful, enjoy benefits from that activity with no downside cost 
unless they are not successful and there is sunk investment in research.19 If 
they choose not to engage in research, they will expand student numbers to 
the extent that revenue is greater than variable costs, and this could lead to a 
proliferation of low-cost and low-quality courses. When there is little 
competition, the quality and cost of the programmes have limited checks. 
Research institutions are less likely to engage in the pursuit of low-cost 
and low-quality courses for two reasons. First, it is unlikely that, after 
making substantial investment in developing a reputation in the research 
environment and in having that reputation recognised and codified through 
the PBRF, they would then risk the institution’s reputation in the pursuit of 
low-quality teaching programmes. Second, with a substantial portion of 
their funding coming from research, research institutions are less directly 
affected by the incentives that are provided by Student Component funding. 
In a world with competition for substantial funding based on research 
performance, TEIs are under pressure to limit the diversity of courses 
offered as part of a process of limiting teaching loads to ensure staff have 
adequate time to focus on research and professional development. 
Conclusion 
The PBRF acts as a measure of performance. In particular, it is a measure of 
the extent to which universities have actually invested in the development 
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of research capacity and hold staff with substantial research time 
accountable for undertaking research. Because of its very substantial impact 
on both the reputation and the income of the universities, it has also 
provided a vehicle for intense competition. We have argued that 
competition between universities is necessary because of the general 
difficulty in assessing quality in service industries and the specific problems 
associated with the stakeholder governance structures and academic 
freedom of universities. 
The PBRF has the benefit of basing assessments primarily on 
publication of research, for which the criteria for assessing quality are 
relatively well defined (by academic standards). The PBRF also has the 
advantage that, in requiring all academic staff to be assessed, it has 
promoted a balance of competition in addressing the issues created by 
research-inactive staff as well as focusing attention on the value of the most 
productive researchers. In our view, the intensity of the competition 
between universities generated by the PBRF is unlikely to lead to an 
overemphasis on research so long as there continues to be competition to 
attract students. But if competition for students is muted by a new funding 
regime, universities would rationally invest less in teaching and learning 
and focus their attention on maximising PBRF revenues. Thus, in an 
environment with a PBRF, the requirement that institutions compete to 
attract students to all their programmes provides an appropriate balance of 
incentives for managers of TEIs and this is true even when Student 
Component funding does not differentiate between students at research and 
non-research institutions. 
Looking forward, we would suggest increasing the amount of PBRF 
funding so long as competition for students is maintained to continue to 
provide institutions with strong incentives to invest in the quality of 
teaching and learning. We also recommend abandoning assessments of peer 
esteem separate from that demonstrated by publications, and placing more 
emphasis on the assessments of internationally credible researchers who are 
not part of New Zealand researchers’ social networks.  
Finally, we suggest the positive impact of the PBRF will be enhanced if 
we continue to promote other aspects of the TEI environment that facilitate 
effective competition at home and internationally. 
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Notes 
1 The authors acknowledge the helpful comments from the editors on an earlier 
draft of this chapter. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors 
alone. 
2 While some of these schemes require cooperation between institutions, this 
simply shifts the competition from the level of individual institutions to 
competition between coalitions. 
3 For discussion of the implications of advances in communication for 
competition, see Evans and Quigley (2004). 
4 Karel (2004) examines the implications of services for competition. 
5 An experience good is a product or service where product characteristics such 
as quality or price are difficult to observe in advance, but these characteristics 
can be ascertained on consumption. The concept is originally due to Nelson 
(1970). It is applicable to tertiary education. 
6 Indeed, there is generally some purpose in the design of funding schemes that 
anticipates or requires managerial response. For example, any scheme designed 
to implement cost control must take into account the nature of the service and 
the presence of asymmetric information, thereby anticipating the response of 
management, staff and students. 
7 Institutions that have small amounts of government funding will be more 
responsive to the consumer demand elements of these institutions’ incomes. 
8 The reputational effect on managers of insolvency does provide some incentive 
to avoid insolvency. 
9 For a discussion of the rationale for, and the place of, state aid, see Karel 
(2005). 
10 Signals about quality of input are commonly relied on in services, since the 
amount and quality of outputs is not easily quantifiable. 
11 In the larger academic labour markets of Australia, Canada, the UK and the US, 
a much greater tradition  than in New Zealand has developed of getting paid 
more by moving to another university, or at least obtaining offers that create the 
option to move to another university. 
12 The empirical findings are inconclusive. When economies of scale are found 
the magnitude of them is typically small. Patterson (2000) concludes there are 
scale and scope economies but largely in smaller institutions. 
13 Although, as we argue below, economies of scale estimation is likely to be 
confounded by the endogenous cost problem. 
14  The 10 countries examined in Porter’s study were: Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
15 We note that not-for-profit firms should not be confused with cooperative 
firms. While the cooperative, in certain circumstances, solves the market power 
problem, being not-for-profit does not. The absence of an interest in surplus 
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from the organisation does not imply an absence of interest in exploiting 
market power settings.  
16 Even before the PBRF’s introduction, there was considerable incentive for 
universities to compete in raising external research contract income. Ministry of 
Education data shows that this form of income has increased substantially in 
recent years, with most of that increase coming from private sector sources 
(Ministry of Education, 2005). 
17 For this discussion we can leave research participation as a choice of the 
institution. 
18 Until the PBRF’s introduction, there was some differentiation in the funding of 
the teaching of research-based TEIs through the so-called research top-ups. 
These differentials are being phased out as the PBRF is phased in – with the 
resulting savings redirected to the PBRF. 
19 The downside cost will also be limited by the possibility of being bailed out by 
the government owner (bailouts come at a cost to managers, but the cost is less 
than that associated with a private firm’s failure). 
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